home *** CD-ROM | disk | FTP | other *** search
- <text id=91TT1700>
- <title>
- July 29, 1991: Walsh:Targeting a CIA Cover-Up
- </title>
- <history>
- TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1991
- July 29, 1991 The World's Sleaziest Bank
- </history>
- <article>
- <source>Time Magazine</source>
- <hdr>
- NATION, Page 17
- SCANDALS
- Walsh: Targeting A CIA Cover-Up
- </hdr>
- <body>
- <p>The independent counsel says the agency's attempt to conceal
- its Iran-contra role could have been discovered much sooner
- </p>
- <p>By Jay Peterzell/Washington and Lawrence E. Walsh
- </p>
- <p> Was the illegal diversion of profits from Iranian arms
- sales to the Nicaraguan contras an unauthorized plot hatched by
- a small band of zealots in Ronald Reagan's National Security
- Council? Or did high-ranking members of the U.S. intelligence
- community not only learn about the scheme and do nothing to stop
- it, but unlawfully help to conceal it from Congress?
- </p>
- <p> Those unsettling questions have become the focus of the
- investigation by Lawrence E. Walsh, who has been the Iran-contra
- independent counsel since December 1986. His inquiry is being
- assisted by Alan Fiers, former head of the CIA's Central
- American Task Force, who has admitted misleading Congress about
- when the agency first learned of the diversions. Fiers now says
- he became aware of the fund transfers during the summer of 1986
- and warned the agency's deputy director of operations, Clair E.
- George, about them. But he charges that George ordered him to
- deny any knowledge of the U.S. role in supplying weapons to the
- contras when he testified before the House intelligence
- committee in October 1986.
- </p>
- <p> Fiers' disclosures may lead Walsh to seek perjury
- indictments against George and others. They have also cast a
- shadow over President Bush's nomination of Deputy National
- Security Adviser Robert M. Gates to become the CIA's director.
- </p>
- <p> Last week the Senate intelligence committee postponed
- Gates' confirmation hearings so that investigators can probe
- further his knowledge of the illegal supply effort. Some
- Senators find it hard to believe that Gates could not have known
- about an operation with which his boss, the late CIA chief
- William Casey, and his subordinates were familiar. Gates claimed
- repeatedly that he had only vague inklings about the
- unauthorized aid in late 1986, when he served as deputy to
- Casey. But late last week, in response to new reports that he
- was briefed several times on help to the contras, the White
- House acknowledged that Gates had played a central role in
- overseeing aspects of the plan--but only the intelligence and
- communications parts that Congress had authorized.
- </p>
- <p> Walsh discussed the case with TIME, including how
- disagreements with Attorney General Dick Thornburgh over the use
- of classified information hindered his investigation. Excerpts:
- </p>
- <p> Q. You've had a lot of problems in this prosecution with
- classified information. How did that affect your work?
- </p>
- <p> A. The classified-information problem is frustrating
- because there is no review of the subjective judgment of the
- intelligence agencies in saying they will not release
- information that a court has held necessary for a fair trial.
- </p>
- <p> It's not just information that the government needs to
- prosecute its case. The problem also arises when the defendant
- asks for information he says is necessary for a fair trial and
- the judge agrees with him. And then the intelligence agency
- holds back that information on what sometimes seems to be an
- excessive claim of the need for the secrecy of information that
- is already publicly known.
- </p>
- <p> In an ordinary prosecution by the Department of Justice,
- the Attorney General can overrule that determination. But the
- independent counsel does not have the power to do so. That
- decision remains with the Attorney General. Whereas the Attorney
- General is fully familiar with prosecutions by his own
- department, he is not comparably familiar with a prosecution by
- the independent counsel--and indeed, I think he has less
- concern for it.
- </p>
- <p> Q. Because it's not his prosecution, he's less willing to
- bear the pain of declassifying?
- </p>
- <p> A. That's right. He would be loath to overrule the
- intelligence agencies in any event; but in his own case he's at
- least in a position to evaluate the importance of the
- prosecution.
- </p>
- <p> In the Joseph Fernandez case I think he grossly
- underestimated the value of that case and the strength of that
- case. [Fernandez, a former CIA agent, was accused of lying
- about his involvement in helping supply arms to the contras. The
- charges against him were dismissed in 1989 because Thornburgh
- would not release classified documents Fernandez needed to
- present his defense.]
- </p>
- <p> Q. You think that if the Attorney General had understood
- the Fernandez case better he would have made the judgment
- differently about whether to declassify?
- </p>
- <p> A. If he were truly concerned about the need for the
- prosecution to go forward. It was a key point for this
- investigation. Now the Fiers disclosures have in a sense
- leapfrogged the Fernandez case. But Mr. Fernandez--as he
- acknowledged in public interviews--was going to implicate his
- superiors. And he named them.
- </p>
- <p> Q. Whom did he name?
- </p>
- <p> A. He named Fiers and George.
- </p>
- <p> Q. You thought the Fernandez case would enable you to
- travel up the CIA's chain of command?
- </p>
- <p> A. Yes, that was the beginning.
- </p>
- <p> Q. After the Fernandez case washed out, did you think that
- Fiers was another likely place to start up that chain of
- command?
- </p>
- <p> A. That was the obvious next starting place. Because Fiers
- was the guy to whom Fernandez reported.
- </p>
- <p> Q. The Fiers plea raises the issue of knowledge by CIA
- higher-ups and of a deliberate policy to cover up that
- knowledge. Is that accurate?
- </p>
- <p> A. I don't want to characterize his statements, because
- he's obviously going to be a witness. But your interpretation
- of the statement, I think, is very fair.
- </p>
- <p> Q. Is there a conflict in the agency deciding what
- information can be released when intelligence officials are
- themselves likely targets?
- </p>
- <p> A. There certainly is the possibility of a conflict of
- interest. And without talking about Fiers, I have said
- previously that I feel that there is a doctrinaire approach to
- classified information and that the protection around it is
- excessive.
- </p>
- <p> Q. So does it create a conflict of interest for the CIA to
- be recommending to the Attorney General what information can
- and cannot be released?
- </p>
- <p> A. There is certainly an appearance of conflict of
- interest. And there can be a conflict of interest depending upon
- how the responsible person at the CIA views the matter. If he's
- concerned with protecting the agency or an officer or former
- officer of the agency from exposure, that's one thing. If he's
- concerned with the protection of information regardless of the
- reason for its exposure, that's something else.
- </p>
- <p> Q. David Boren, the chairman of the Senate intelligence
- committee, wants to ask Fiers and George what Gates knew about
- Iran-contra. Do you plan to indict George?
- </p>
- <p> A. I can't talk about our plans that way. But we recognize
- the need and desire of the committee to get as much information
- as it can. We hope that it can be done without in any way
- jeopardizing our investigation. And always the biggest threat
- to an investigation or prosecution is a grant of immunity to a
- witness. We hope that any immunity would be very sparingly used.
- </p>
- <p> Q. The Fiers plea has raised the question of whether Gates
- knew about illegal support to the contras much earlier than he
- says he did and lied to Congress about this. It's hard to
- imagine the committee acting on his nomination without resolving
- that question. How can they resolve it?
- </p>
- <p> A. You really have a dilemma here. An inquiry about one
- person in isolation is rarely satisfactory or credible. Rather
- than investigating the acts of a single individual, you have to
- build up a broad context, examining an activity and all its
- ramifications. That gives you the background to evaluate each
- individual and make a satisfactory decision about whether he's
- involved or not.
- </p>
- <p> It really begins with a massive records search and the
- evaluation of the testimony of each witness in light of what has
- been learned from the records. And then the evaluation of each
- succeeding witness in light of what has been told by others.
- </p>
- <p> So if the committee wants to know what happened five years
- ago, they are confronted with the need to make that kind of
- comprehensive investigation themselves, rather than just asking
- one or two people. Or they can await the outcome of our
- investigation.
- </p>
- <p> Q. You are building up that sort of complex understanding
- of how things worked at the CIA?
- </p>
- <p> A. Yes. Fiers' disclosures require us to look into a CIA
- cover-up.
- </p>
- <p> Q. I take it Fiers' plea is not really the beginning of
- your look at the CIA.
- </p>
- <p> A. I think you can assume we've been looking into this
- since the Fernandez thing.
- </p>
- <p> Q. Gates was Casey's executive assistant in 1981. Some
- people see that as significant; an executive assistant tends to
- know everything his boss is doing. And that may be relevant in
- evaluating the relationship between Casey and Gates when he was
- his deputy.
- </p>
- <p> A. [Pause.]
- </p>
- <p> Q. Well, you've said you were surprised by Fiers'
- admissions. Why?
- </p>
- <p> A. By the specificity. Usually when defendants first
- decide to assist the prosecution they are more likely to do it
- in a generalized way. It doesn't seem to come out as clearly
- thought out as Fiers' statements in court were.
- </p>
- <p> Q. Another conflict is whether Congress should investigate
- cases like Iran-contra because there is a need for public
- exposure, or wait for a criminal prosecution to bring the facts
- to light. How well do criminal prosecutions, even if you're
- willing to wait, serve the public-exposure interest in a case
- like this?
- </p>
- <p> A. I think they serve it quite well. New facts do come
- out. The criminal process is much slower. It has to be in order
- to protect the legitimate interest of each defendant. But the
- information does come out in each trial.
- </p>
- <p> Q. You've certainly gotten some new information from Mr.
- Fiers.
- </p>
- <p> A. I think so.
- </p>
- <p> Q. Do you feel vindicated, in terms of the usefulness of
- the office, by this break? You were in a frustrating situation
- for a while.
- </p>
- <p> A. We were in a frustrating situation. I hesitate to use
- the word vindicated. The difficulty of the assignment which the
- office drew was obvious. And the difficulties were compounded by
- the immunity and classified information problems.
- </p>
- <p> If additional disclosures come because of the testimony of
- any witness, and particularly a cooperating witness who is very
- well informed, why I think that adds to the value of the work of
- the office.
- </p>
- <p> Q. How long are you going to operate?
- </p>
- <p> A. If I finished up tomorrow, I could not say I hurried.
- [Laughs.] But obviously, we have to follow up the leads that
- come from the Fiers disclosures. We've been trying to wind up.
- But that isn't what happened. He's opened an area that has to
- be investigated.
- </p>
-
- </body>
- </article>
- </text>
-
-